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ESSAYS
Ten years ago, in 1983, the Yale Journal on Regulation was started by
students at the Yale Law School to foster scholarship and debate on issues of
regulatory policy. Today the Journal staff consists· of students from Yale
University graduate and professional programs in law, management, forestry,
and public health. One of the Journal's primary missions was to track the
regulatory/deregulatory developments under the Reagan Administration and
later the Bush Administration. Since our tenth anniversary coincided with the
installment ofa Democratic Administration under President Clinton, we have
asked two professors at the Yale Law School to submit an essay discussing a
policy issue in their respective field of expertise and any predictions and
recommendations they have as a result of the new administration and change
ofparty leadership.
Tax Policy at the Beginning of
the Clinton Adminisfration
Michael J. Graetzt
When this Journal asked me to write a short essay on tax policy at the
beginning of the Clinton Administration, I thought it odd; however, now that
this Administration's first set of tax proposals has been unveiled, a journal on
regulation seems the perfect place for a few observations. Before commenting
on where tax policy seems to be heading, I shall try briefly to describe where
we are-with a backwards glance at how we got here. l
The Deficit
The key political and economic fact motivating the first tax proposals of
the Clinton Administration is the size of existing and projected deficits. The
Administration concluded that a major effort at deficit reduction is essential to
the health of the American economy.
In fiscal year 1992 that ended last September 30; the federal government
had a deficit of about $290 billion, or nearly 5% of gross domestic product
(GDP)-a very high figure but still below the record 6.3% reached in fiscal
tJustus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Law School, B.B.A. Emory Univ., 1966; L.L.B. Univ.
Virginia, 1969. This essay is based in part on a lecture delivered at the University of Southern
California Tax Institute in January, 1993.
1. For a somewhat similar exercise, see Alvin C. Warren, The American Tax Agenda in the
1990's, lecture to the faculty of Law, Bar Han University (Dec. 1992). .
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year 1983. In fiscal year 1980, before Ronald Reagan took office, the deficit
was $74 billion, about 3.7% of GDP-a comparable number today would be
about $180 billion. The last Budget released by the Bush Administration in
January 1993 estimated a deficit for fiscal year 1993 of more than $325 billion,
over 5% ofGDP, which is then expected to decline before rising again in 1998
to $320 billion, or nearly 4% of GDP.
While we have all learned to take such projections of future deficits with
a bit of salt, they do suggest that the deficit is not simply going to behave like
Alice's cheshire cat and disappear. Even with economic growth substantially
higher than the economic forecasts of most economists for 1993, the deficit is
estimated to be nearly $200 billion in fiscal year 1998 if federal tax and
spending policies are not changed.
The cumulative federal debt held by the public, including foreigners, is now
about $3 trillion and is estimated to rise to nearly $5 trillion over the next five
years, in the absence of a major reduction in projected deficits.2 Interest on the
federal debt paid to the public in fiscal year 1992 was about $290 billion, more
than 20% of total federal outlays and about 5% of GDP. The share of federal
spending to pay interest on the federal debt is at an all-time high, either as a
percentage of total federal outlays or of GDP.
Federal deficits, however, are not a recent phenomenon. Fiscal year
1969-24 fiscal years ago-was the last year that we had a balanced federal
budget.
Contrary to popular notions, tax reductions in the past decade do not explain
the nation's current deficit condition. Taxes in fiscal year 1992 were $1.1
trillion, or 18Y2%of GDP. Outlays .were $1.4 trillion, about 23Wro of GDP.
Federal taxes historically have taken a relatively constant share of GDP: 17.7%
in 1950-55; 18.2% in 1960-65; 18.4% in 1970-75; 19.7% in 1980-85; and
18.5% today. The current and projected deficits exist principally because, while
the level of taxes has remained relatively constant, federal spending has
increased as a share of GDP over time-beginning in the late 1970s from about
20% to 23-24% of GDP today. Major increases in spending have included:
defense, income security, health care, and interest on the federal debt.
When one adds state and local taxes to the federal take, total U.S. taxes are
about 30% of GDP. This is low by international standards-the average for
OECD countries is about 38%, with a range from 29-56%. But those countries'
spending patterns are also different, especially with regard to health and
education where the government's share of spending is much higher than in
the U.S. .
2. I am dealing here only with debt owed to the public and not debt owed within the government,
such as the social security trust funds.
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Total federal revenues have increased in both real and nominal terms
because GDP has grown consistently over a long period of time. The important
point here is that economic growth-not changes in the kinds or rates of tax,
nor a dramatically more burdensome federal tax structure-has long been the
engine of federal revenues. Obviously, to reduce or eliminate the deficit, either
federal spending will have to be reduced significantly, or taxes must be
increased, or both. The economic proposals of the Clinton Administration
reflect this transparent reality. Before discussing these proposals, however, I
shall describe briefly five important tax policy events of the past decade.
Five Key Tax Policy Events
The key political tax event of the last decade or so was the tax limitation
movement, starting with Proposition 13 in California, followed shortly by
Proposition 2 in Massachusetts, and culminating in 1988 with George Bush's
notorious "No new taxes" pledge. The tax limitation movement has generated
two important current developments: First, it is unmistakable that the
conservative promise of the tax minimization movement has been shattered at
the federal level. Contrary to conservative dogma, tax reductions do not neces-
sarily mean spending reductions or a reduction of government size-at least
in the absence of a balanced budget requirement. Second, the American popu-
lace has learned to resist additional taxes. Despite the new public interest in
deficit reduction and the general popularity of "soaking the rich," an overall
increase in tax burdens can still be very costly to politicians. Together, these
two facts make deficit reduction an extremely difficult task.
In addition to state constitutional amendments and legislation that limit
taxation, four particularly important federal tax enactments warrant special
mention.
First, although the Economic Recovery and Tax Act of 1981 is best known
for its overall rate reductions and business and real estate tax incentives, its
most significant enduring feature was the elimination of rate bracket creep
through inflation adjustments. These inflation adjustments eliminated the
sizeable automatic income tax increases that had been produced even at
relatively low levels of inflation. The lasting revenue impact of this change is
dramatic-far greater than is generally known. If inflation adjustments had not
been enacted, we simply would not be facing the deficit problem that is now
of such economic and political concern.
As a political matter, inflation adjustments to the personal exemption,
standard deduction, and rate brackets eliminated the escalation of revenues that
previously had enabled Congress routinely to provide tax cuts; instead they
created a plateau, requiling Congress to enact explicit tax increases to boost
revenues. This produced a now familiar case of legislative paralysis.
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Second, the 1983 Social Security Amendments moved Social Security from
a pay-as-you-go system to a system based on an "actuarially sound financing"
of the retirement benefits of the baby boom generation. The employment tax
was increased substantially in an effort to fund future benefits, and, as a result,
the Social Security Trust fund is now experiencing annual surpluses of about
$300 billion.
Indeed, even though the overall federal tax level has remained relatively
constant over a long period of time, the share of employment taxes to finance
Social Security has increased dramatically relative to GDP, changing substan-
tially the composition of U.S. taxes. The sole cause of the increased tax burden
on middle-income taxpayers is not income tax increases but rather the payroll
tax increases to finance Social Security. But the promise of future benefits has
not served to offset the popular perception that the wages of the middle class
are being overtaxed. Moreover, this change may be having an adverse effect
on the nation's level of private savings, although whether or not this is actually
occurring is quite controversial.
Third, the far-reaching 1986 Tax Reform Act was the result of an uneasy
political marriage between the conservatives' desire for low tax rates and the
liberals' desire for a broad tax base.3 Both sides of this compromise are now
under attack and seem to be in considerable jeopardy from the Clinton
Administration's tax proposals. Additionally, the most important aspect of the
1986 Act-the decision to strengthen the income tax rather tlian to replace it
with a consumption tax-isl).oW being challenged. However, President
Clinton's emphasis on increasing income taxes of higher income individuals
suggests that complete substitution of consumption taxes for the income tax
resides in some distant future.
Finally, the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act provided a blueprint for the
Clinton Administration's tax and spending proposals and established new
budget enforcement and process provisions. It abandoned the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings sequester mechanisms-automatic spending cut mechanisms-in favor
of two devices: (1) specific spending caps for defense and for domestic and
international discretionary spending, and (2) a pay-as-you-go system for
revenues and entitlement spending, which required new tax cuts or entitlement
spending increases to be offset by either tax increases or entitlement spending
cuts. Despite the Clinton's Administration's call for retention of much of this
structure, this budget enforcement process clearly is not stable. The financing
of domestic spending is to be contingent upon defense spending cuts, and the
failure of the 1990 Act to control spending on entitlements-particularly for
Medicare and Medicaid-must be remedied in the forthcoming health care
3. See generally, Michael J. Graetz, The Truth about Tax Reform, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 617 (1988).
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reforms. The 1990 Act also foreshadowed the political tax debate' of the 1992
election: during enactment of the 1990 Act, economic growth and tax fairness
were treated as mortal enemies.
As one congressional staffer has observed, in 1991 and 1992, the 1990
Budget provisions survived a war, drought, floods, flre, recession, the collapse
of communism and, against all odds, a Presidential election year.4 It remains
to be seen whether they will survive Democratic leadership at both ends of
Pennsylvania Avenue. In early 1993, President Clinton has already declared an
"emergency" under the 1990 Act in the hopes of enacting a short-term fiscal
stimulus package without spending or revenue offsets. Only a Republican
fllibuster in the Senate thwarted this effort.
Ironically, the much maligned political deadlock, along with the pay-as-you-
go provisions of the 1990 Act, had a very beneficial effect on the tax system.
After enactment of nine major tax bills containing more than 8,000 pages of
statutory changes during the period 1981 to 1990, th~re was no significant tax
legislation in either 1991 or 1992. Although the unending threats of forthcoming
legislation added risk to investment decisions during that period, at least neither
~he IRS nor taxpayers and their advisers had to struggle with new legislation
or new tax forms. Unfortunately, this brief stability of the tax system is destined
to end in 1993.
Let me turn now to the Clinton proposals for tax changes.
The Short-Term Stimulus
The President's short-term tax and spending proposals are far more
important politically than economically. President Clinton simply could not
afford to be a mere bystander to the economic recovery that seemed apparent
in the fourth quarter of 1992. But his $30 billion of proposed fiscal stimulus
would have little short-term economic impact, and it makes little or no
economic difference whether his proposed new spending or temporary
investment tax credit proposals are enacted.
In fiscal year 1992, the deficit was $110 billion lower than the Bush
Administration had estimated in January, principally due to postponed savings
and loan expenditures, but with more than $30 billion of the reduction resulting
from increased revenues and reduced outlays. There is simply no evidence that
this fiscal change made any difference to the nation's economic performance.
Thirty billion dollars is not a large amount in a $6 trillion economy. The
nation's short-term economic health remains primarily in the hands of the
Federal Reserve. Even with low interest rates, the growth in the monetary
4. William Hoagland. The 1990 Budget Agreement. One Year After-One Year Ahead, Address at
American Enterprise Institute & Japan Economic Foundation Conference Session: Present Status of U.S.
and Japan Economies 2 (Nov. 9, 1990),
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supply has been consistently below the Federal Reserve Board's targets and the
President knows well that real help from the Fed is essential to economic
recovery. It was no accident that Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
occupied the seat of honor next to Hillary Rodham Clinton at the President's
State of the Union address.
The condition of financial institutions is also important to the nation's short-
and long-term economic health. Financial institutions have-for many
reasons-become much more cautious in their lending policies; they have been
holding record levels of Treasury debt, and their lending to businesses has been
weak. President Clinton has promised to address this situation, and we await
the details.
Long-Tenn Deficit Reduction
The heart of the President's economic plan, of course, is his program for
long-term deficit reduction. Here I will discuss only the tax aspects of his
proposals, putting aside both his proposed reductions in defense spending and
shifts in domestic spending priorities.




Tax the fellow behind the tree.
During the campaign President Clinton's fellows behind the tree were "the
rich" and his proposals fulfill his campaign promise of higher tax rates on
upper-income individuals. The Democrats have clearly now become committed
to the belief that an increase in top marginal income tax rates will not inhibit
economic growth. The top federal rate under the Clinton proposals will exceed
40%-an increase of about 10 percentage points. The individual minimum tax
will also increase, and the proposals contain a significant expansion of earned
income tax credits for the working poor.
President Clinton's proposals contain bui a faint echo of a long history of
redistributional tax politics in the United States-beginning' with Wilson,
continuing with Roosevelt, and up to the present-which has been marked by
increases in taxes on corporations. Clinto'n seeks to increase the corporate tax
rate from 34 to 36% and to offset any economic risks from such a change by
introducing an investment tax credit for certain small businesses and an
incremental investment tax credit for other businesses. The Clinton
Administration defends this reversal of the 1986 tax reform by citing certain
566
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economists' arguments that equipment purchases play a special role in
stimulating economic growth.s Space does not permit an in-depth evaluation
of the President's investment credit proposals here, but skepticism about the
economic effectiveness of this trade-off-as well as about the practical viability
of an incremental investment tax credit-is surely warranted.
During the 1992 campaign, President Clinton also promised to raise $45
billion of revenue from foreign-owned corporations, adding a second stanza




Tax the firms across the sea.
In his proposals, however, the promised $45 billion of additional revenue
from foreign-owned corporations has dwindled to less than $4 billion, mId the
President's international tax proposals instead increase taxes on U.S. owned
multinationals by about three times that amount. Ironically, the most
controversial of these proposals, which would revise the treatment of foreign
source royalties of U.S. multinationals, seems to undercut Clinton's oft-repeated
desire to encourage multinational companies to conduct research and
development of new technologies and products in the United States. This essay
is being written prior to any congressional action on the specifics of the
President's proposals, but it would not be surprising if the incremental
investment tax credit were to disappear and the corporate tax increase scaled
back as the tax legislation progresses through Congress.
The President also proposed a targeted capital gains tax cut, particularly
valuable to owners of. certain small and medium sized businesses. Indeed-
although small business would be defined three different ways in qualifying
for lower corporate tax rates, investment tax credits, and capital gains relief-
for many proprietorships, Subchapter S corporations and partnerships, these tax
reductions would be countered by increased individual-level tax rates.
Tax relief for middle-income taxpayers, promised in the campaign, was not
recommended; instead the President proposes income taxes increases for Social
Security recipients with more than $32,000 of income ($25,000 single) and a
broad-based energy tax on heat (BTU) content, not only to further deficit
reduction but also out of concern for the environment and for reducing our
dependence on foreign sources of oil.
5. See. e.g.• J. Bradford Delong & Lawrence H. Summers. Equipment Investment and Economic
Growth: How Strong is the Nexus? 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC Acnvrrv 157 (1002); cf Jane
G. Gravelle. Tax Subsidies for Investment: Issues and Proposals. Congressional Research Service No.
92-2055. Feb. 21. 1992.
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The most difficult practical economic, and perhaps political, obstacle to
implementing the energy tax is its failure to make border adjustments that
would exempt exports and tax imports of products where energy is a substantial
component of price. This induces manufacturers and farmers to complain that
the tax unfairly burdens domestic production of such products and hurts their
competitive position in both domestic and international markets. Before a broad-
based energy tax can be enacted, an exemption for manufacturing and
agriculture may prove politically necessary, but that would require a rate
increase on other energy uses to meet the President's revenue targets and would
at least somewhat blow the "ecocover" of the tax. When the legislative dust
settles, Congress may settle for a simple increase in the gasoline tax. If so, the
likelihood of a value added tax increases in the not so distant future.
The energy tax is but one instance where the Clinton Administration
proposes to use the tax system to direct investment or consumption or even as
a substitute for regulation. Other· examples include denial of income tax
deductions for lobbying or for executive compensation in excess of $1 million
not appropriately or sufficiently linked to the company's performance.
Incidentally, the latter proposal, which would turn tax consequences on
shareholder approval of executive pay, conflicts with the SEC approach to the
executive pay issue, which heretofore has relied on disclosure rules and
nonbinding shareholder resolutions.
Using the tax system to further specific industrial policies seems to be a
direction the Clinton Administration plans to continue. For example, two
months after the State of the Union Address, newspaper reports indicated that
the Administration was considering using the tax system to benefit the airline
industry. Likewise, selected excise taxes on tobacco and perhaps on alcohol and
firearms have been mentioned by Administration officials as potential financing
sources for health reform, although one should never underestimate the political
resistance of Joe SixPack. At the Andrews Budget Summit in 1990, the late
Silvio Conte proposed taxes on junk food and soda pop, which California has
since adopted, thereby proving Will Rogers' old adage that when a legislature
makes a joke, it's a law.
Unlike direct regulation, using the tax system to deter energy or tobacco
consumption creates special problems for an administration that has made tax
fairness its rallying cry. These taxes would fall more heavily on lower- and
middle-income taxpayers than on persons with higher incomes. Similar
distributional consequences occur with regulations that tend to increase prices
without corresponding remittances to the government, but their regressive
efforts have been more easily ignored in the political process.
The current context, however, in which taxes are being increased on specific
items of consumption that the nation wants to reduce for health, conservation,
or environmental reasons, may create an opportunity for Congress to begin
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looking at tax distributional issues in a new light. In contrast to a broad-based
consumption tax, in this case people could substantially reduce their tax burdens
by shifting to less harmful consumption patterns. When Congress has regulated,
rather than taxed, .items to reduce consumption, it has demonstrated little
concern for distributional burdens. This, for example, has distinguished
proposals for a tax on sulfur or nitrogen emissions from the regulation and
emissions trading mechanisms of the Clean Air Act of 1990.
At a minimum, Congress should view the distributional burden of such
selected excise taxes over a longer time horizon rather than solely by short-term
references to annual in·come. Tobacco taxes have been found to be proportional
to lifetime income, and alcohol taxes slightly progressive.6 Some low-income
offset, however, is clearly required to ease the burden of a significant broad-
based energy tax on low-income taxpayers and this is one reason the
Administration proposed increases in the earned income tax credit.
Using tax increases for both regulatory and revenue purposes does create
a special problem for achieving success on both fronts. To the extent that the
regulatory goal is successful and consumption of the heavily taxed goods
decreases, the amount of revenues produced from the tax will also decline. This
suggests that the level of the tax must be well calibrated to produce the desired
compromise between the regulatory and revenue goals-an exercise which does
not inspire great confidence. It seems far more likely that either the anticipated
revenues will prove elusive or that the regulatory (environmental, health, etc.)
benefits will be overstated-or, more likely, both.
As occurs with many regulations, targeted tax increases often have
unintended effects. The most obvious unintended consequence of the Clinton
proposals is the increase in the marriage penalties for both high- and low-
income families. Even though so-called "family values" was a rallying cry of
the other party, surely these effects are accidental. The additional tax burden
for low-income people with children who marry could rise to more than $4,000
a year under the Clinton proposals. Likewise, for high-income two-earner
married couples, the best tax planning strategy may be divorce. Two single
people can earn $230,000 before the Clinton tax rate would increase from 31
to 36 percent, but only $140,000 if they marry-a tax difference of $4,500 a
year, and the additional 10 percent surcharge kicks in for a married couple at
$250,000 of income, but an unmarried pair can earn $500,000, for a potential
tax savings of more than $13,000.7 In the late 1960s, Congress created a
marriage tax penalty that gave young people a reason for living together
6. See. e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF ALcOHOL TOBACCO AND
MOTOR FUELS (June 1990).
7. For additional calculations of the tax burdens on marriage, see Ellen E. Schultz, Living in Sin
to Cut Tax Bill Would Look Even Better to Some Under Clinton Plan, WALL ST. J.• Mar. 9, 1993, at
C-I to C-2. .
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without marrying that their parents could understand. In the 1990s, President
Clinton may be giving some of these same people a reason for divorcing that
their children can comprehend.
It is no accident that I have not mentioned tax simplification-the process
of lessening the burdens and costs of complying with the tax laws by making
them simpler to comprehend and deal with. If the President's tax proposals are
to be taken as a guide, the Administration seems not to be taking seriously the
economic burden of tax compliance. Tax simplification is no priority. In the
Clinton proposals, simplification is the dog that did not bark.
The Big Wild Card
As President Clinton well knows, reform of the nation's health care system
poses the greatest threat to both the fiscal responsibility and the political
credibility of his administration: If means to flatten the rate of growth of this
nation's medical costs are not found quickly, achieving a sound economic and
fiscal position for the country may be little more than a pipe dream.
President Clinton's budget proposals contain more than $60 billion in
proposed Medicare and Medicaid savings during the period 1994-1998-$17
billion in 1997 alone. He also proposes eliminating the ceiling for high-income
people on the payroll tax that funds Medicare's part A hospital insurance to
produce an additional $25 billion in revenue during 1994-1998. These savings
are critical to achieve the deficit reductions the President has promised. But,
at an average cost of $2000 a person, extending health insurance to the 37
million people currently uninsured is a $75 billion a year problem (ignoring
the $10-15 billion of savings that hospitals may realize from no longer having
to provide emergency room or other care to the uninsured). This suggests that
substantial amounts of mandated premiums or a payroll tax or some other
broadly applicable tax is likely to be necessary to avoid huge deficit increases
from the Clinton Administration's forthcoming health reform proposals.
Ultimately, President Clinton may have to duplicate Franklin Roosevelt's Social
Security feat and convince the American people that a payroll tax is an
insurance premium-a maneuver that should prove far more difficult in light
of people's experience with Social Security. If a second round of tax increases
to finance these proposals is to be kept to a minimum, it may be necessary to
divert any Medicare and Medicaid savings to financing the expansion of health
care access. Health reform is the lingering other shoe of President Clinton's
deficit reduction endeavor. To see where it falls, we will have to await Act II.,
On both the tax and health issues, one should be alert to scorekeeping
games. Dick Darman, George Bush's Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, for example, would simply count the tax increases and spending
reductions twice. But in this Administration of change, that will not be possible.
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Nevertheless, there will be great pressures on the Friends of Bill to overestimate
revenue gains' and cost savings and to underestimate tax reductions and
spending increases. This scenario is an old story. Congress, for example,
ignores revenue losses that occur subsequent to the five-year budget window
and routinely counts and spends revenue increases from extending expiring
provisions-such as estimated tax changes-while ignoring the revenue
decrease from the expiration. The Clinton proposals follow these longstanding
traditions. But if the citizenry is genuinely serious in its demands for deficit
reduction, increased attention to such accounting maneuvers will be
required.
The Longer Term
After Congress works its will on the Clinton economic and health care
proposals, at least six major tax policy issues will remain on the longer term
agenda.
The first is the future role of consumption taxation at the federal level. This
nation's low reliance on consumption taxation is currently the largest difference
between the U.S. and the tax systems of our trading partners. Consumption
taxes account for an average of 30% of revenue in other DECO countries
versus 17% here. The apparent desire to increase revenues, coupled with a
desire to stimulate increased private savings, are powerful arguments for
consumption tax advocates and have produced widespread agreement among
economists that additional revenues 'should come from taxing consumption. The
Clinton Administration has seemed to settle on an energy tax, coupled with
specific excise taxes on such things as tobacco and alcohol, in lieu of a broad
based consumption tax, such as a business transfer tax (BIT) or a value added
tax (VAT).
The Clinton proposals for increasing top income tax rates make clear that
a broad based consumption tax remains very unlikely to replace income taxes,
at least for high income individuals. The more interesting question is whether
a BTTor VAT could be enacted to replace both the proposals for selected
excise taxes and a substantial portion of income or payroll taxes for middle-
income taxpayers. Such an outcome seems far more realistic in the near-term
if President Clinton's proposal for an energy tax is defeated or is made so
complex through exemptions and special rates that it proves not to be viable.
Second is the issue of the future of payroll taxes. The growth of the payroll
tax to finance Social Security and Medicare hospital insurance is surely the
most important development in the federal tax structure over the past four
deca~es. These taxes have risen from less than 10 percent of total budget
receipts in 1952 to nearly 40 percent in 1992. As I suggested earlier, the impact
of this increase has been especially dramatic for low and moderate income
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earners. The growth in the wage-based payroll tax has been defended on the
ground that wage-based taxes are appropriate to finance wage-replacement
social insurance for unemployment, retirement, or disability. The Clinton
Administration is also considering a payroll tax as a principal source of finance
for its health insurance proposals.
The payroll tax is now well entrenched as an important source of federal
revenues, but its structure is haphazard and, on the whole, regressive.s Even
at its current level, there are important concerns about compliance, particularly
in the classification of workers as employees or independent contractors and
a substantial increase in payroll taxes will raise concerns about their effect on
both employment and middle-class tax burdens. As the population of the U.S.
ages in the years ahead, with fewer workers supporting more retirees, the ability
to rely on payroll taxes to fund social insurance will decrease. At a minimum,
restructuring and better coordination of payroll taxes seems likely in the years
ahead, and substitution of consumption taxes for all or part of the payroll tax
will also likely reach the political agenda.
The third long-term issue is corporate tax integration. Over the long-term
the present corporate tax system seems very unstable, particularly in its
preference for debt over equity and in favoring noncorporate 'over corporate
investment.9 The current income tax preference for housing investment relative
to corporate investments is striking, as are the consequences. lO Virtually all
of our trading partners have at least partially integrated their corporate and
individual income taxes, and at some future time we also seem likely to move
in this direction.
Fourth is the subject of taxation of international income. This may be the
most difficult long-term issue. The growth and speed of international capital
markets threaten the nation's ability to fashion its own tax system. Our
normative underpinnings for taxing international income either conflict with one
another or are unattainable in practice, or both. Efforts to strengthen one's own
national position are threatened by beggar-thy-neighbor reactions by one's
trading partners. Economic knowledge concerning the effects on ourdomestic
economy of international tax options is very much in its infancy. The current
division of business income among source arid residence countries is archaic,
but difficult to change.
President Clinton by now knows that his campaign rhe~oric-Iooking to
foreign corporations for large amounts of revenues-offers no solution, even
8. See generally, Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax
Policies, U. PENN. L. REv. (1987).
9. See generally, U.s. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, INTEGRATION OF THE CORPORATE AND
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES; TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (Jan. 1992) and AMERICAN LAW
INSTlnITE, REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION (1993, Alvin C. Warren. Reporter).
10. See U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, supra note 9, at 5.
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in the short-term. His international tax recommendations to date reveal
protection of the United States tax base as his short-term goal, and there seems
to be some desire in the Administration to use the tax system for protectionist
goals. In the short-term, this nation's international tax law seems likely to
continue the instability begun in the 1986 l~gislation, while both analysts and
policy makers search for a coherent multilateral policy. In the meanwhile,
continuation of the international trend towards lower withholding taxes
especially on intercorporate dividends seems likely. Ultimately I believe that
in order to maintain incomes taxes on production within the U.S. economy we
will move in the direction of source-based taxation of business income, perhaps
along the lines of Treasury's January 1992 Comprehensive Business Income
Tax Proposal. 11
Fifth, the tax system needs a more coherent response to the continuing and
rapid development of a variety of financial instruments. The market for over-'
the-counter financial derivatives, such as interest-rate swaps, currency swaps,
and related financial instruments has grown from about $3 billion a decade ago
to more than $3 trillion today. The current income tax is ill-equipped to deal
with the complexity of these instruments, their ability to take new forms, and
their rapid growth. To date, the income tax system has been responding on an
ad hoc basis, sometimes dividing a new financial instrument into its component
parts in an effort to reveal assets familiar to the tax system, sometimes
combining two or more financial transactions to produce something
recognizable to the income tax. The internationalization of financial markets
makes this problem one of staggering complexity. The Treasury response to
date tells taxpayers: "Don't go too far; Don't be too abusive to the income tax."
These new financial instruments and their internationalization may pose the
greatest threat to the nation's ability to tax capital income, and may ultimately
prove to be the Achilles heel of the income tax.
Finally, we must rethink our federalist system of taxation. The multistate
taxation of corporate income is showing increasing strains as state tax rates
have increased-strains that are related to the taxation of international income
of these same entities. Wasteful costs of compliance with multiple tax systems
have escalated for individuals and businesses alike. For example, large
multistate retailers may be required to file more than 100 state and local sales
tax forms each month. States, of course, must be free to set tax rates to meet
their fiscal requirements, but we must think seriously about moving to greater
uniformity in state tax bases and greater coordination among federal and state
tax laws and enforcement. As experience with attempting to encourage state
11. See id. at chapter 5.
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piggybacking on the federal income tax base demonstrates, this will be a
daunting political challenge.
Conclusion
For both the long- and short-term, the goals of the nation's tax and fiscal
policies will be what they always have been: to facilitate growth ofthe nation's
economy and to do justice in the distribution of the burdens and benefits of
government. During the recent years of divided government, the political parties
have treated economic growth and fairness as if they were enemies. Bill Clinton
has now promised a reconciliation-a fairer tax system that encourages savings
and investment and nurtures economic growth. However, his detailed tax
proposals do not engender confidence that these goals, which we all share, will
be realized.
President Clinton's State of the Union address to Congress marked the
end-at least for now-'-Of divided government in the United States. TIle
Democrats' outpouring of applause on that occasion demonstrated their
enthusiasm for controlling both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. An era of
bipartisan conflict and compromise over matters of tax and budget policy has
ended. Liberated from any responsibility for governing, Congressional
Republicans are now free to behave purely as the opposition, a role some will
find quite congenial. Democrats believe they must compromise only with
themselves. They can claim credit for success and must bear responsibility for
failure. '
In Great Britain, 1992 also marked the end of a tax policy era. For the first
time since Edward's abdication of the throne in 1936, the monarch has agreed
to pay taxes. On this side of the Atlantic, the pain of increased taxes shall be
spread more broadly.
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